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Preface
Financing Community Energy project
Commencing in 2016, the Financing Community Energy 
project aims to provide the first systematic quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the role of finance in the evolution of 
the UK community energy sector. It is led by the University of 
Manchester, working with the University of Strathclyde and 
Imperial College London, and forms part of the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC) research programme.
The project involves a literature and data review analysing 
the development of community energy to date; a UK-wide 
survey and statistical analysis of community energy finances 
and business models; in-depth case studies of a range of 
community energy business models in practice; and an ongoing 
stream of policy and practice engagement.
This report presents the second of four case studies of UK 
community energy organisations conducted during 2018/19. 
These will later be included as part of a synthesis briefing 
alongside a series of sector-level interviews. The case study 
makes use of a combination of qualitative (e.g. interviews, 
organisation reports) and quantitative (e.g. financial reports) data.
UK Energy Research Centre
This project was undertaken as part of the UKERC programme, 
funded by the Research Councils Energy programme. UKERC 
carries out world-class interdisciplinary research into 
sustainable future energy systems. It is a focal point of UK 
energy research and a gateway between the UK and the 
international energy research communities. Our whole-systems 
research informs UK policy development and research strategy.  
For information please visit: www.ukerc.ac.uk 
Follow us on Twitter @UKERCHQ
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1 Mission statement and value proposition
2 For the full list of interviewees in this case study, see Appendix A.
3 Our Financing Community Energy survey records the actual costs at £1.4m (S1).
GEM is a Community Benefit Company (BenCom) that owns and 
operates Garmony Hydro. It is a run-of-the-river hydro scheme, 
located near the east coast of the island of Mull, part of the 
Inner Hebrides of Scotland (Figure 1). The “overriding” purpose 
of GEM is the creation of a revenue stream for investment in 
“long term transformational sustainable change” for the islands 
of Mull, Iona and smaller neighbouring islands (I21).2 Making a 
positive contribution to the environment is an important albeit 
secondary objective (I21). 
GEM generates its revenue from exporting electricity generated 
by the hydro to the grid and from subsidies such as the Feed in 
Tariff (FiT). Any surplus revenue is gifted to the Waterfall Fund 
(see Section 4.5.3), a charity specifically set up for the project to 
distribute the funds to worthy causes around the local islands. 
 
2 Origins and development
GEM owes its origins to Mull and Iona Community Trust (MICT), 
a community development charity founded in 1997. MICT’s role 
is to “formulate strategies and provide practical support to local 
projects aimed at improving the social amenities, and physical 
and economic infrastructure of the islands” (MICT, 2019a). An 
informal organisation called Mull and Iona Renewables grew 
around MICT, essentially “a group of people who started off 
having a chat about what could the island do” in relation to 
renewable energy (I21). 
Members of the group became more proactive with the 
introduction of the FiT in 2010. They convinced others in the 
broader MICT organisation that the development of energy 
assets could “be a very significant income generator for the 
island” (I21). As a result, MICT began investigating the prospect 
of creating some kind of electricity generation asset. 
During this time, MICT built up a relationship with Community 
Energy Scotland (CES), which would both advise the group 
throughout the development process and provide financial 
assistance in the form of grants for feasibility work, through 
the Community & Renewable Energy Scheme (CARES) grants 
scheme (see Section 4.5.4). The feasibility study identified a 
potentially suitable site for a hydro scheme. It also estimated 
total capital costs for project delivery to be between £800,000 
and £1.3m (Green Energy Mull, 2014).3 
Green Energy Mull key facts
1 This sum does not include the £35,000 allocated by GEM to their community benefit fund (Company Accounts, 2018).
Year established 2013
Location Mull, Scotland
Legal structure Community Benefit Society (BenCom)
Annual turnover £242,000 (2018)
Net surplus £20,0781 (2018)
Total assets £1.43m (2018) 
Generation capacity 400 kW (run of river Hydro), estimated to provide 1 GWh per annum (~280 homes and 3.5% of island’s 
demand (CES, 2018)
Finance Combination of loans and community shares
Subsidies Combination of grants and long-term revenue payments, e.g. Feed-in-Tariff (FiT)
Number of FTE staff Green Energy Mull (GEM) has no full-time staff, but Mull and Iona Community Trust employed a project 
manager to be responsible for the Hydro project
Number of regular volunteers Fewer than 10
Number of members 216 
Key partnerships Mull and Iona Community Trust, Community Energy Scotland, The Waterfall Fund, Forestry and  
Land Scotland
(Source: interviews; company accounts 2018)
Summary of key lessons
• Government subsidy is the cornerstone to securing both 
community and private finance. By providing a substantial 
long-term guaranteed revenue stream, the FiT allowed GEM 
to raise community investment and further investment from 
commercial and state-backed lenders. Even with the FiT in 
place, sourcing commercial finance was challenging. In its 
absence, it is unlikely that commercial lenders will lend.  
• The ability to raise community finance is dependent on the 
affluence and population density of a locality. Unable to 
raise all the finance it needed from the community of Mull, 
the organisation was forced to access more expensive loan 
finance. 
• Communities present important test beds for innovation, 
but direct long-term benefits may not be forthcoming. In 
its role as a trusted local organisation, GEM demonstrated 
an important role for community energy in facilitating 
innovation, but the extent to which it has been able to 
benefit from this is questionable. 
• Partnerships with public landowners are critical to project 
delivery. Forestry and Land Scotland made land available 
for use by GEM, which was critical to their hydro scheme. 
Without this the project could not have taken place. 
Figure 1: GEM project location (Source: Google and the Waterfall Fund)
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There were various hurdles to be overcome before money could 
be raised for construction. These included obtaining planning 
permission from Argyll and Bute Council and a water extraction 
license from the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, both 
achieved in 2012. Moreover, informal discussions had commenced 
with the Scottish Government agency Forestry and Land 
Scotland (FLS),4 on whose land the group hoped to construct 
the hydro, about establishing a 40-year lease of the site. 
The project leadership had particular struggles around pre-
accreditation5 (LES, 2015). The hydro was pre-accredited 
in December 2012, with the express purpose of benefitting 
from a new FiT subsidy band exclusively for 100–500 kW 
hydro schemes. However, the group was not informed that 
the implementation of the band had been delayed, leading 
the project to be pre-accredited at a lower rate than initially 
intended (LES, 2015). After an appeal to the Secretary of State, 
the project was able to pre-accredit at a higher rate. Even so, the 
greatest challenge reported by the group – which threatened 
the entire project – was securing a grid connection (I21; I22) 
(see Section 4.1).
 
4 At the time of the project’s development, the MICT dealt with Forestry Commission Scotland (FCS). Since then, FCS’s responsibilities have been taken over by a 
new body called Forestry and Land Scotland (Forestry Commission Scotland, 2019).
5 Pre-accreditation means that a project is registered for a specific rate of FiT applicable at the time of registration, not the rate at the time when it is actually built.
6 Now called the Energy Investment Fund (EIF) (Scottish Enterprise, 2019).
7 The total cost of the project was £2.5m. It was released in two phases, the first phase being £1.8m.
Community shares were prioritised as a source of funding, with 
any shortfall being made up by loans. MICT was “instrumental” 
in establishing GEM a BenCom, in September 2013 to raise 
a share offer to finance the hydro project (I22). The following 
month, the share offer was launched, targeting a minimum of 
£333,000. The target was ultimately exceeded, with £485,000 
raised by mid-2014. Having obtained more than a third of the 
cost for the project through the share offer, GEM then applied 
for and obtained the remaining funds as a loan from the Charity 
Bank and the Scottish Government-backed Renewable Energy 
Investment Fund (REIF6) (Section 4.5.4).
In 2015, Local Energy Scotland (LES) awarded £1.8m to a 
Community Energy Scotland-led consortium, which included 
MICT, to deliver the Assisting Communities to Connect to 
Electrical Sustainable Sources (ACCESS) project. The objective 
of ACCESS was to identify ways of overcoming grid constraints, 
using load control, network monitoring and innovative 
communication systems (Section 4.1). Shortly afterwards, in 
June 2015, Garmony Hydro began generating power. The ACCESS 
project came to an end in April 2017. 
Table 1: Timeline of milestones
1997 MICT founded as a charitable company limited by guarantee (CLG).
2012 A feasibility study is conducted, and MICT launches a business plan to develop a hydro facility on Mull. 
2013
September: Green Energy Mull, a BenCom, established by MICT to finance a hydro project. 
November: community share offer launched.
2014
£485k raised in community shares (S1).
May: construction starts
2015
January: the Waterfall Fund charity established to distribute grants derived from surplus of hydro project.
March: LES awarded a £1.8m grant for the ACCESS demonstration project.7 
April: ACCESS project begins.
June: Garmony Hydro begins generating electricity.
2017 April: ACCESS project comes to an end.
(Source: interviews; company accounts)
3 Legal structure
A key consideration for the establishment of a BenCom was to 
deploy it as a “special purpose vehicle” to raise sufficient funds 
to enable the hydro project to take place, but for it to be “independent 
of the charitable activities that MICT carries out” (I22). The 
formal separation of MICT from the legal owner and operator of 
the hydro facility was considered important for several reasons. 
Firstly, the creation of a new company was required “because 
of the financial risk to the parent charity that was perceived by 
the creation of the renewable energy scheme”, which “if it went 
wrong … could have wiped out the charity” (I22). Secondly, 
there was the matter of public opinion. The group did not want 
the endeavour to be perceived merely as an attempt to raise 
money for MICT; it was therefore important to MICT’s leadership 
that it was made “sure that in terms of local opinion it was seen 
to be totally separate” (I22). 
A share issue was considered the most obvious way to raise 
the finance for the project (see Section 4.5.4), however the 
conventional route of forming a public limited company (PLC) was 
rejected for ethical reasons. As the GEM project manager explains: 
“[I]f you talk to any lender [they say] just make 
yourself a public limited company and sell 
shares … but of course then our sort of ethical 
background kicks in, and you say, well, you 
don’t want somebody with more shares having 
more control than somebody with only one or 
two” (I21).
Table 2: Comparison between ordinary and community shares
Ordinary shares (issued by PLC or CIC) Community shares (issued by BenComs or bona fide 
cooperatives)
One share, one vote:
• Greater number of votes in key company meetings depending on 
the ownership stake. 
One shareholder, one vote:
• Each member has one vote in key company meetings 
regardless of size of financial stake in company. 
Strict regulatory compliance:
• Accounts must be independently audited.
• Company must stand on its own accounts.
• Financial Services Ombudsman (FSO) settles disputes between 
sellers and purchasers of PLC shares. 
Light regulatory compliance:8
• No independent audit required.
• No FSO dispute resolution.
Expensive: £10,000 or more for initial share offer.  Approx. £700 for initial share offer. A cap of £100,000 on 
any single investment held by one shareholder.
Highly liquid:
• Ordinary shares are traded on London Stock Exchange.
• A familiar financial instrument for institutional investors, such as 
banks or investment firms and can therefore attract large sums.
• Shares can be sold for more or less than the price at which they 
were initially sold.9 
Illiquid:
• Community shares cannot be traded and can only be 
withdrawn from the issuing society. 
• Community shares cannot be sold for more than their 
face value, but may decrease in value.
(Source: Community Shares Unit, 2019; I8; I12; I21)
8 Community shares are defined as withdrawable and not transferrable.
9 The shares issued by a CIC are the same as those issued by a PLC and have the same benefits, regulatory compliance issues and costs.
The group also considered setting up a community interest 
company (CIC), but this was also rejected because “the 
administrative overheads of creating a CIC that can sell shares 
to the public were immense” (I21). For a summary of the key 
features of ordinary shares and community shares see Table 2.
The group also explored cooperative structures, i.e. the 
bona fide cooperatives and BenCom. However, the broader 
community benefit element of the BenCom structure was an 
important factor (for a summary of common legal structures see 
Appendix C). GEM’s project manager explains that in bona fide 
co-ops there is “closed membership” for those who buy shares; 
an individual member then “reaps all the benefit” (I21). This 
refers to the fact that, with the bona fide cooperative structure, 
the organisation is run specifically in the interests of its 
members. It need not, as is the case for BenComs, demonstrate 
the provision of benefit to a wider community which does not 
include its membership.
In contrast to the other possible legal structures, they found 
that the BenCom model was “just what we wanted” in that it 
provided:
1. limited liability for the members and directors; 
2.  the option of “inviting investments from local people and 
from like-minded individuals elsewhere”; 
3.  the option to “accept donations” and “take out commercial 
loans” (I22); and
4.  an equitable governance structure: “it was one member, one 
vote, regardless of how many shares you bought” (I21). 
It is, however, worth noting that, in order to qualify as a voting 
member, shareholders had to hold at least five shares, with 
a combined value of £250. This meant that only individuals 
with this level of disposable income were able to shape the 
direction of GEM. Whilst the BenCom was established to raise 
funds for the project, and subsequently construct and maintain 
the hydro, a separate organisation was created to disburse 
the surplus revenue – a charity called the Waterfall Fund (see 
Section 4.3.2). 
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4 Business model
10 In 2017/18, GEM’s accounts show administration fees of £3,550 which we assume is the sum paid to MICT for administering the venture (GEM, 2019).
11 “Curtailment is a reduction in the output of a generator from what it could otherwise produce given available resources, typically on an involuntary basis” (Bird, 
Cochran and Wang, 2014 p.iv). Naturally, this can have a negative impact on the pay-back period the hydro scheme would offer.
12 The restriction of limiting a new generator’s export to a maximum 50kW currently applies to much of Argyll and other areas of Scotland (CES, 2018).
4.1   Activities
The core responsibility of GEM is to oversee management of 
the hydro facility, but, in practice, many of the core operational 
activities are carried out by staff of MICT. MICT receives an 
annual management fee for undertaking these duties.10 Work 
involves “arranging and overseeing maintenance operations, 
metering, accounting, reporting and administration” (Green 
Energy Mull, 2014: 11). For example, MICT organises weekly 
checks of Garmony Hydro, to ensure that the intake grille is free 
of debris, and annual maintenance checks, which are sub-
contracted to specialists Argyll Industrial Supplies (I21). 
MICT arranges and actions payment for the lease of the land, 
insurance for the facility, and funds for decommissioning and 
for the community benefit fund, which it pays to the Waterfall 
Fund charity (ibid). It has also negotiated the Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs) with suppliers for the sale of electricity to 
the grid (see Sections 4.2 and 5). 
Beyond the management of the hydro facility and associated 
administrative duties, GEM and the MICT leadership have 
been involved in ACCESS, a major technology demonstration 
project. The project was instigated to resolve a key problem 
facing community energy in remote areas. Mull and Iona, as 
well as large swathes of the west coast of Scotland, have grid 
infrastructure in place with insufficient capacity to accommodate 
significant additional local energy generation. 
“We can’t get power off the island ... We can’t 
get it further south than about 50 miles north of 
Glasgow. There is a piece of kit in Taynuilt which 
isn’t big enough. Now, the only way to overcome 
that is for Ofgem to allow National Grid to spend 
a vast amount of money ... So, if we wanted to 
build another scheme, we would be limited to 
50 kilowatts that we could export” (I21)
This issue originally threatened to derail the entire GEM project. 
After the initial work had been completed, and “all the financial 
viability was done” (I21), MICT approached the Distribution 
Network Operator (DNO) Scottish and Southern Energy Networks 
(SSEN) to arrange a grid connection, only to be told that their 
facility could receive only a 50 kW firm connection to the grid. 
Firm grid connections are the “traditional, and prevailing, 
approach to distribution system planning” (Džamarija and 
Keane, 2013: 2162). They have been described as a “fit-and-
forget” policy, where the amount of output that a generator 
can export to the grid is fixed by the connection agreement and 
does not vary depending on conditions (the balance of supply 
and demand) in the distribution network (Ochoa et al., 2010: 1). 
While a firm grid connection agreement may allow a generator 
to export at full capacity, an assessment is made by the DNO 
about whether that might threaten the operation of the network 
under certain conditions. If the assessment concludes that new 
generation capacity has the potential to cause a fault in the grid 
network, then the new generator may be curtailed,11 i.e. it is 
prohibited from exporting to the grid at full capacity. 
In the case of the Mull Hydro project, the GEM leadership 
was told by SSEN that the transmission network could only 
accommodate 50 kW of the 400 kW that the hydro plant could 
potentially generate. This was reflected in a 50 kW connection 
offer made from the network operator to GEM. Because financial 
viability calculations had been done on the basis of the facility 
having no such constraint, the constraint “essentially rendered 
the project unviable at that point” (I21). 
Ultimately, the constraint problem was solved for Garmony 
Hydro because a planned windfarm project nearby was 
abandoned, freeing up sufficient capacity on the local grid 
for Garmony Hydro to operate at full capacity, i.e. regardless 
of conditions in the local grid. However, with the available 
capacity taken by Garmony Hydro and other new generators, the 
area became grid constrained once more, making it very difficult 
for new generation projects to be commissioned in the future.12  
Although GEM was no longer affected by the grid constraint, its 
leadership was well aware of the potential benefits of the ACCESS 
project for community energy electricity generation in general. 
Thus, GEM accepted a CES invitation to work with SSEN and 
several other companies to participate in an experiment to 
demonstrate the use of load control, network monitoring and 
innovative communication systems to overcome the problem 
of the constraint placed on the local grid, through a non-firm 
grid connection and an active management approach. GEM was 
specifically chosen, as it already had a firm connection, so there 
was no risk to the network if the experiment failed (I33). This 
became the ACCESS project. 
The ACCESS project is one example of an experiment regarding 
alternative, non-firm grid connections currently being initiated  
by DNOs in the UK (UK Government, 2014). With non-firm grid 
connections, instead of a cap being placed on how much power 
a generator can export, DNOs take a more active approach and 
curtail a generator only “in emergencies or at given times of the 
day, depending on the contractual agreement between the two 
parties” (UK Government, 2014: 11). The non-firm connection 
approach has one key advantage compared to the firm grid 
connection. The assessment for firm grid connections of whether 
a new generator’s output might destabilise the network is based 
on a worst-case scenario of “maximum generation at minimum 
demand” (Ochoa et al., 2010: 1), even though in practice this 
may mean that “90% of the time, the existing [network] assets 
can cope” with a generator generating at full capacity (I24). 
What this means is that most of the time “capacity [of 
distributed generators is] restricted despite the opportunity 
for much higher energy production” (ibid). By taking a more 
active role in network management by deploying a non-firm 
connection approach alongside active management of local 
networks, DNOs are able to facilitate more electricity being 
exported to the grid from distributed generators. 
In this context, the project goals were as follows: 
1.  “To demonstrate real time balancing of renewable 
generation (1x 400 kW hydro generator) and distributed 
demand (c.100x homes and businesses);
2.  To develop an affordable network protection and 
communications system for enabling ‘non-firm’ grid access 
to transmission-constrained generators;
3.  To engage with and provide benefit to local homes and 
businesses; and
4.  To create the commercial arrangements required for future 
deployment and roll out (‘local heat tariffs’)” (CES, 2015: 8).
The experiment had two key elements. The first involved 
installing safety measures which a) monitored conditions 
in the local grid and b) allowed the Garmony Hydro facility 
to be remotely disconnected from the network in the event 
that the hydro’s electricity generation threatened to cause a 
(simulated13) fault condition in the local grid. 
The second key element involved balancing local supply from 
the Garmony Hydro with local electricity demand. The experiment 
sought to demonstrate that, by distributing electricity “locally, 
the grid could continue to operate within its statutory voltage 
limits and margins of safety and still allow new generation to be 
built and connected” (CES, 2018a: 14). To achieve this, the 
13 In reality, this was an artificial constraint as, at the time of the ACCESS project, Garmony Hydro was not grid constrained.
14 These use an electric element to heat the water to supply an existing radiator system.
15 Subject to the property needing heat, or the heat being stored in a hot water tank or storage heaters (I33).
project sought to monitor and manipulate “controlled loads” to 
balance supply from the hydro with demand from islanders. 
Controlled loads were created by the use of storage heaters, 
flow boilers14 and hot water cylinders which were hooked up 
to monitoring and communications equipment and installed 
in local properties on the island (CES, 2018). To compensate 
for the inconvenience of installation work, participants were 
offered £250 for participating in the full trial (LES & Ricardo 
Environment, 2018). These technologies were somewhat 
intrusive; during periods of grid constraint, these heaters could 
be switched on remotely to consume excess electricity generated 
in the hydro to protect the local grid.15 However, outside of times 
of constraint, heat was available as normal (I33). 
Whilst it was envisaged that the new and more efficient 
heating systems would reduce energy usage and, therefore, 
households’ bills, householders were provided with 
compensation for any increased energy usage that resulted from 
the project. When the project came to an end, householders 
benefitted from keeping the new heating systems in place but 
now disconnected from the smart grid (Section 4.4.1.2).
GEM had two key roles in the ACCESS project. Firstly, it was 
involved in the recruitment of local households and businesses 
for the project. MICT’s role was as a trusted intermediary in the 
community, explaining the nature of the project and the potential 
benefit to the islanders. In accordance with MICT’s social 
mission, during the recruitment process GEM gave “priority 
to properties and householders where we felt that they were 
likely to be in fuel poverty” (I22). From an initial 100 homes that 
showed interest, a total of 73 properties were included in the 
project on the basis of compatibility with the proposed heating 
and control system (I24). The majority of these were privately 
owned. However, 18 homes were owned by West Highland 
Housing Association (LES & Ricardo Environment, 2018). 
The second key role of the community energy group was to 
deploy the Garmony Hydro plant in the experiment. This 
involved making the facility available to be reconnected to the 
grid using inter-trip technology (see Section 4.4.1.2). GEM 
could continue to generate as normal, apart from during a small 
number of test events agreed in advance. During the test 
events, the generation of Garmony Hydro was reduced, both 
by switching it off totally and by modulating output in order 
to match local demand. GEM was reimbursed for any lost 
generation resulting from simulating curtailment during the trial.
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4.2   Customers
GEM has one core customer: an energy supplier to which it 
sells electricity through a PPA. GEM initially had a PPA with 
Solarplicity;16 as of 2019, GEM moved its PPA to Good Energy. 
Both suppliers specialise in electricity sourced from  
renewable energy. 
However, GEM wishes to develop a different arrangement with 
suppliers to create a local energy tariff. Speaking in 2018, GEM’s 
chair lamented the “gap … of ten pence a kilowatt” between 
what GEM received for selling electricity to the grid via its 
agreement with Solarplicity (at approximately 5.5p per kWh) 
and what the typical customer pays for the same volume of 
electricity (around 15p p/kW) (I22). It is hoped that partnering 
with a supplier for the creation of a local energy tariff would 
allow GEM to capture more value from the electricity that it 
exports to the grid (see Section 5). 
4.3   Partners
In this section, the partnerships that GEM has formed are 
outlined. Key partners include: (1) MICT, (2) The Waterfall Fund, 
(3) Community Energy Scotland, (4) FLS and others. 
4.3.1 Mull and Iona Community Trust –  
Community Charity
GEM’s most important partner is MICT. GEM and MICT are legally 
separate, but they have been created to deliver the same 
mission statement: to improve wellbeing on the islands they aim 
to serve. Indeed, despite the legal separation of the two 
organisations, in practice it is not obvious where one organisation 
ends and the other begins. As we have seen, the Garmony 
Hydro project was initiated by MICT. We have also seen that 
the key agent of GEM is an employee of MICT. Moreover, as the 
general manager of MICT explains, “the vast majority of the 
board of directors of Green Energy Mull are members of MICT” 
(I22). The general manager of MICT is himself the chair of GEM. 
What is more, the key activities of the BenCom are in practice 
carried out by MICT (Section 4.1). 
4.3.2 Waterfall Fund
A separate charity was created to disburse the surplus revenue 
of Garmony Hydro. On its board of trustees are a local councillor, 
community councillors, church minister, bank manager, head 
teachers and two island residents (The Waterfall Fund, 2019d). 
There were two main reasons why a further charity was 
established to manage the surplus revenue generated by the 
hydro scheme. One was that the new charity would be able 
to apply for grants for projects, independently of its sister 
organisations of MICT and GEM. More significantly, there was 
the issue, again, of local opinion on the island. It was felt that 
wider community support for the project would be more likely 
if the profits were to be distributed across the island and not 
retained for the benefit of the Trust (I21). For this reason, it was 
considered better if it was “seen that [the hydro] wasn’t just an 
income generator for the community trust” (I21).
16 Solarplicity ceased to trade in August 2019 (Ofgem, 2019).
17 This has since been superseded by the Community Asset Transfer Scheme, following the  Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 and the Community Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act 2015.
However, the project manager believes that the earlier suspicion 
about MICT and its motives from segments of the community 
has abated, as the organisation has grown and its benefit has 
been more widely felt around the islands. He explains that, 
if MICT were to instigate another generation project, it “will 
definitely just be a community trust income generator” (I21). 
In other words, it would not create a new charity or use the 
Waterfall Fund to disburse funds. Instead MICT would receive 
the funds and use them to deliver on its objectives.
4.3.3 Community Energy Scotland – intermediary
CES works in partnership with community groups who wish 
to build their understanding and capacity to create a more 
democratic energy system (CES, 2019). From the outset of 
the hydro project, CES has provided advice and support, 
from feasibility grants (Section 4.5.4) to initiating the ACCESS 
project. CES put together the consortium bid to the Local 
Energy Challenge Fund which part financed the ACCESS project. 
They also facilitated the relationship between the MICT/GEM 
leadership and SSEN, VCharge and Element Energy, which 
underpinned the project. 
4.3.4 Forestry and Land Scotland – landowner
Another significant partner of GEM is FLS, the Scottish Government 
agency tasked with managing and promoting Scotland’s publicly 
owned forest estate. As noted previously, Garmony Hydro is sited 
on FLS land, and GEM holds a long-term (40-year) lease for the 
site, which it pays rent for (Section 4.5.2). GEM’s project manager 
explains that with FLS “there [were] many hurdles to be jumped” 
but believes that this “would have been tenfold had we gone with 
the purchase option” versus the lease (I21). 
At the time, purchasing the land from FLS would have been 
through the National Forest Land Scheme.17 As explained by a 
member of MICT, the main reason for deciding against purchase 
was “because we needed a long narrow strip of land within a 
commercial operating forest environment. As the owner of such 
land, we would have been subject to legislation for protecting 
against deforestation, as well as involvement with operational 
issues” (I22), which they were not expert on. The leasing 
arrangement was considered the best solution, despite the 
annual ground rent due.
All in all, the experience of working with FLS was a positive one; 
the project manager says that it was an agency with which it 
was very easy to work (I21). The willingness of FLS to support 
GEM’s hydro project is based on the close alignment between 
the two organisations’ strategic objectives. Engagement with 
communities by all public bodies in Scotland is supported by 
the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, which gives 
community organisations a right to request to take over publicly 
owned land or buildings, if the organisations can demonstrate 
they can make better use of the land for local people (Scottish 
Government, 2017). There is a presumption of agreement to 
such requests, unless there are reasonable grounds for refusal. 
Community groups can take over land, through either purchase 
or lease agreements via a Community Asset Transfer (FLS, 2018). 
FLS has a responsibility to “maximise the contribution of the 
National Forest Estate to Scottish Government outcomes”, which 
amongst other aims focus on “[reducing] the local and global 
environmental impact of our consumption and production”, as 
well as “[having] strong, resilient and supportive communities 
where people take responsibility for their own actions and how 
they affect others” (FLS, 2018: 12). Underpinning this is the 
objective to “realise our full economic potential with more and 
better employment opportunities for our people” (ibid: 12). 
FLS responsibilities can be considered to be well aligned with 
GEM’s plans for a community-managed hydro plant that provides 
local people with power and invests in community initiatives.
One of FLS’s criteria for making land available was to demonstrate 
local support for the project through a ballot of the entire 
community (Forestry Commission Scotland, 2010). But this was 
a positive experience, as it allowed MICT to engage with the 
community about the plans for the project (I21). GEM has the 
option of renegotiating the lease after 40 years “so the scheme 
could be in place for many, many years” (MICT, 2014: 21).
4.3.5 Distribution Network Operator
GEM formed a partnership with SSEN, the network operator, 
during the ACCESS project. This relationship was managed by 
CES, with little interaction between GEM and SSEN (I24). It is 
not obvious how GEM directly benefitted from this relationship. 
The project helps demonstrate how a grid constraint could 
be managed by the use of smart technology, but, at the time, 
Garmony Hydro was no longer subject to a grid constraint (see 
Section 4.1). Furthermore, whilst the new heating systems 
remained, the smart grid was effectively disabled after the 
demonstration project (Section 4.4.1.2). 
However, GEM might be understood to have benefitted indirectly 
from its relationship with SSEN during the ACCESS project. The 
project proved the workability of an approach to overcoming 
grid constraints, which benefits another community energy group 
on Mull – South West Mull and Iona Development (SWM&ID), with 
which GEM is informally linked (e.g. sharing board members) (I21) 
(see Section 4.4.1.2). As such, GEM’s involvement in ACCESS 
improved GEM’s social capital on the island. Moreover, should 
GEM at some point wish to embark upon another generation 
project, it will no longer suffer from the grid constraint, providing 
other options for the community energy group’s development. 
On the other hand, SSEN has capitalised directly on the ACCESS 
project. The principal benefit for SSEN in working with GEM was 
to demonstrate that it was possible, through innovative use of 
grid infrastructure, to “make better use of the network that’s 
there” and thus potentially save significant costs in upgrading the 
existing grid infrastructure (I24). Secondly, SSEN has benefitted 
because ACCESS’s outcomes have informed how SSEN has offered 
grid connections to other small-scale renewable generators in 
constrained areas (see Section 4.4.1.2). The elements of the 
project that concerned installing network technologies to 
manage transmission limitations have since been replicated 
“probably half a dozen or more” times elsewhere in Scotland (I24).
4.3.6 Other
GEM has employed a range of technical specialists to deliver 
the hydro project (I21). The design and construction project 
management was tendered and won by Campbell of Doune, a 
structural and civil engineering consultancy based in Crieff in 
central Scotland. Construction was tendered and won by TSL 
Contractors, a Mull-based Civil Engineering Company. Connection 
18 The provider of demand-side response (DSR) equipment and infrastructure oversaw domestic equipment removal for the ACCESS project (CES, 2018).
to the national grid was carried out by Integrated Utility Services, 
a power-engineering contractor which is a subsidiary of 
Northern Powergrid, the DNO for north-east England, Yorkshire 
and North Lincolnshire Ecological monitoring was carried out 
by the specialist Dr Phillip Radcliffe. Suppliers of the turbine 
and related equipment was Kestrel Controls, a family-owned 
manufacturer and supplier of electrical control. Maintenance is 
undertaken by Argyll Industrial Supplies (see Section 4.1).
GEM also has a partnership with VCharge,18 which emerged from 
the ACCESS project. VCharge is now part of OVO Energy and GEM 
is in dialogue with the company regarding the establishment of 
a local energy tariff, one means through which the community 
energy group hopes to derive greater value from its existing 
energy asset (as discussed in Section 4.2 and 5).
4.4   Resources
4.4.1 Technological resources
The technologies deployed in the case of GEM can be separated 
into two categories: firstly, the technology deployed for 
generating electricity, a “run of the river” hydro power station; 
secondly, the technologies deployed, as part of the ACCESS 
project, for testing methods to actively manage generation and 
demand on the local network.
Hydro-electricity generator
Members of the community energy group were not fixed on any 
particular renewable technology. In the end, a run-of-the-river 
hydro facility was chosen for several reasons (Figure 2).
 
 
Figure 2: Garmony Hydro Scheme (MICT, 2019)
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Firstly, it was envisaged that a hydro generator would provoke 
less opposition from the local community than would wind 
turbines. As the GEM project manager explains:
“[Y]ou could sort of split the island in two 
between those that think wind turbines 
are brilliant and those that [think they] are 
the scourge of the island [and] will murder 
everything that flies past and decimate the 
attraction for people coming” (I21). 
Secondly, there was the ease of grid access. The feasibility 
study that MICT commissioned suggested wind was not 
viable, because the suitable sites were some distance from 
transmission lines, meaning that grid connection costs were 
prohibitive. In contrast, power lines ran near the preferred site 
for a hydro facility, making it the preferred choice in that regard.
Thirdly, the potential hydro site was just off the main road, so 
that access for construction purposes would be straightforward. 
However, “it was still tucked within an existing forestry 
plantation” and would therefore have little aesthetic impact on 
the wider landscape (I21). 
Fourthly, being a run-of-the-river hydro scheme meant that 
the facility would not involve the creation of a reservoir, and 
so the impact on the landscape would be minimal. However, 
this created a greater threat of low- or no-power generation, 
following prolonged dry spells.
In general, the expectation that hydro would be met with less 
resistance versus other technologies (e.g. wind) was considered 
key when selecting a technology. Amongst other factors, this 
was because the site was on FLS land, and the FLS would only 
make the land available if the project had widespread support 
amongst local people (Forestry Commission Scotland, 2010). 
The island’s population was balloted. There was turnout of 
over 60% from the island’s total population, who voted 96.6% 
in favour of the scheme (MICT, 2014). “There were no major 
demonstrations or any negativity in building it at all” (I21), 
smoothing the way for the creation of the facility.
Ease of access to land also affected the scale of the facility. It 
would have been technically feasible to have built a larger hydro 
plant. However, land ownership issues deterred the group. The 
project manager says that the option existed, but doing so would 
have meant having to deal with two landowners: the FLS and 
another private landowner. They decided to keep the project 
small to “keep it as simple as we can" (I21). In this regard, a 
run-of-the-river hydro facility not only kept the project relatively 
small but also suited the river site, with minimum alterations 
needed, as opposed to having to dam the river to create a larger 
body of water.
Technologies for actively managing electricity generation and 
demand on the local network
Balancing local supply of electricity with local demand and 
safeguarding the broader grid infrastructure for non-firm 
grid connections constituted two key element of the ACCESS 
project. Balancing local supply and demand involved several 
key technologies. Some homes with storage heaters adequate 
for the experiment had controls retrofitted into the domestic 
heating systems. Others had Dimplex Quantum storage heaters 
installed. Homes that had LPG or oil heating saw these replaced 
with electric flow boilers, which use an electric element to 
heat the water to supply an existing radiator system (I22). The 
company VCharge also fitted monitoring equipment and remote 
switches on these systems, so that the amount of energy the 
systems used could be tracked and electrical heating loads 
could be switched on or off remotely to be matched with 
the electricity being generated at the hydro plant. Linking 
local generation to local supply whilst using existing grid 
infrastructure created a “virtual district heating” system (CES, 
2015: 14), making use of surplus electricity to provide heat (I24).
To safeguard the broader network a “repeater” and an “inter-
trip” were installed at the substation feeding the island of 
Mull (I22; I23). The repeaters were designed to make an 
additional signal from the local network available, which 
allowed the balance and supply of electricity on the island to be 
monitored.19 If this signal indicated that there was imbalance 
and a fault condition was likely, then the inter-trip could 
disconnect Garmony Hydro remotely from the network.20 
The final report into the ACCESS project published by CES draws 
conclusions on these two key technological elements of the 
project. It states that it was “a significant achievement” that 
the project demonstrated “that local loads can be switched on 
and off remotely to match the power output of a hydro-electric 
generator” (CES, 2018a: 10).21 The project demonstrated means 
to create tariffs, using the technology to link power produced 
locally to power consumed in individual local properties. Now 
proven, the intellectual property is available for licensed energy 
supply companies to attempt to monetise (I22). However, whilst 
the properties that had had new heating systems installed were 
permitted to keep them, the smart technologies which created 
a virtual district heating system were removed, and Garmony 
Hydro is no longer linked to the trial households. 
Garmony Hydro, and Mull more broadly, were effectively a 
test-bed for the ACCESS project. Given that the hydro was 
not actually a constrained generator, there was effectively 
no commercial rationale for the smart grid equipment to be 
retained after the project (I33). In effect, the hydro has “a 
firm connection for the full capacity it can generate and is 
not dependent on the technology to generate and export its 
full output to the grid” (I22). However, as more generators 
are connected in the constrained area, the commercial 
deployment of such load-balancing systems is likely to become 
more attractive, as a means of reducing constraints on new 
generation. This situation could see the commercial application 
of the ACCESS project on the island in the future (I33).
The report also found that the “remotely-controlled inter-trip 
network solution is technically suitable for purpose and might 
therefore be used for new, otherwise constrained, generators” 
(CES, 2018a: 70). The inter-trip remains in place. Indeed, SSEN 
is rolling out the inter-trip signalling system across the DNO’s 
area as part of its new Alternative and Flexible Connections 
package (SSEN, 2018: 24). This package allows new generators 
in constrained areas to attain non-firm grid connections, which 
will enable them to export more power to the grid, and therefore 
generate more revenue from energy assets, than they would 
under firm but constrained grid connection agreements 
(see Section 4.1). It is through the Alternative and Flexible 
Connections package that South West Mull and Iona Development 
is currently pursuing a grid connection (I21). From the DNO’s 
perspective, the package also allows SSEN to connect greater 
generation in constrained areas, without the enormous expense 
of upgrading the network to eliminate the constraints. 
The ACCESS project demonstrated that, under current 
circumstances (i.e. with the current level of constraint on a local 
network), the localised smart technologies deployed as part of 
the project to balance supply and demand across the island of 
19 The repeater enabled a signal to be generated from the monitoring equipment of the substation which would allow “visibility of network data”, i.e. information 
about the balance of supply and demand in the local grid, to be available to the operators of Garmony Hydro (I24). If a fault condition became likely, the operators 
of Garmony Hydro had three minutes to intervene (I23). If no intervention was made, the inter-trip allowed SSEN to switch off the generator.
20 “SSEN assisted in the design of the inter-trip signalling” (CES, 2018: 73). 
21 An SSEN report into the project put it like this: “The project demonstrated that a constrained generator can operate at its maximum output without impact on the 
electricity network, through controlling loads in the local area to make optimal use of surplus generation” (SSEN, 2018: 23).
22 “Relates to the positive charges and negative credits associated with the local distribution of exported electricity on to the grid. GDUoS for generators are 
calculated differently depending on where the generator is located and where they connect to the local electricity distribution network … if reinforcement works 
are required for things like transformers and cables in order to connect the generator to the local grid the generator in question will result in a positive charge” 
(Good Energy, 2016).
23 “TRIADs are a potential bonus for generating exported power at peak demand times. TRIAD periods measure the average demand on the Grid during three half 
hours between November and February each year” (Good Energy, 2016).
Mull are not required to safeguard the grid infrastructure. This is 
on the condition that other technologies (e.g. repeaters and an 
inter-trip) are maintained upstream to safeguard supply in the 
grid constrained (I21).
More generally, the project demonstrated that the use of smart 
technology and more flexible grid connection agreements could 
allow existing grid infrastructure to accommodate increased 
renewable generation. All else being equal, this should assist in 
a more rapid roll-out of renewable technologies.
4.4.2 Human
The delivery of the hydro project has benefitted from 
the considerable skills and experience of the board and 
management team of GEM and MICT. In total, GEM has eight 
volunteer directors and MICT has ten. 
Skills from engineering and management backgrounds are 
particularly evident. MICT’s general manager – and the chair 
of GEM – has a “background in mechanical engineering and 
construction and project management and design” (I22). 
GEM’s project manager was a “product manager for a financial 
software company” (I21). Another founding member of GEM and 
director owns and runs a hydraulic and Pneumatic Company 
and has “over 25 years’ experience in the fluid power industry” 
(MICT, 2012). MICT’s directors are drawn from “retailing, 
tourism, accommodation, education, farming … and commerce” 
(MICT, 2019c). 
Interestingly, two of GEM's leading figures (its chair and project 
manager) report that they moved to the island of Mull from the 
mainland primarily for a lifestyle change (I21; I22). 
4.5   Finances
4.5.1 Income
GEM recorded a turnover of £242,000 in the year ending 
March 2018, with its income based primarily on the sale of 
electricity and the FiT. It earned almost £40,000 from its PPA 
with Solarplicity. But this sum was dwarfed by the £191,000 it 
received from the FiT (GEM, 2019). In other words, of revenue 
derived from its energy asset (Garmony Hydro), 80% is derived 
from the FiT, with only 20% being from the sales of electricity to 
the supplier. 
Two other sources of income are indicated in GEM’s accounts: 
Passthrough income of almost £8,000 in 2018 and income from 
other services of £4,000. The Director of GEM explained that 
some of the income might have stemmed from compensation 
for shutting down the hydro plant at times during the ACCESS 
project or through receipt of Generator Distribution Use of 
System (GDUoS)22 or TRIAD23 payments.
Figure 3: Before and after installation of the ACCESS network system (CES, 2015b)
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GEM secured a high FiT rate of 15.5p p/kW compared to that 
available for more recent projects, because the group had 
initiated the project early enough and attained a preliminary 
accreditation in 2012 (Green Energy Mull, 2014). This is secured 
for a period of 20 years from commissioning in 2015, providing 
revenue until 2035. 
While the FiT provided a substantial and secure revenue stream 
over a long time horizon, building the business case for Garmony 
Hydro based on the FiT, however, has presented two key 
challenges for the community energy group. Firstly, it required all 
groups to source finance privately, due to state aid limitations:
“[T]he main overreaching restraint that you have 
is … if you want to claim the Feed-in-Tariff, you 
can’t use public funding, because that would 
effectively double fund your project … you’ve got 
to go to private sector lenders to finance it” (I21).
Sourcing funds from the private sector was a particular 
challenge, because, as a third sector organisation, it was 
“certainly something that was alien to the community trust” 
(I21) (more detail in Section 4.5.4). 
Secondly, to attain the FiT the project had to be delivered within 
a strict two-year schedule, creating a very tight deadline for 
a large and expensive project such as a hydro scheme. Had 
the deadline not been met, and the agreed FiT rate not been 
available at the date when the facility became operational, this 
may have jeopardised the viability of the project. 
However, in general, the FiT is considered to have been 
essential for the financial viability of Garmony Hydro. Moreover, 
the project manager questions whether GEM would have been 
able to raise the finance for the project had pre-accreditation 
for the FiT not been in place. Without pre-accreditation, he says, 
the “banks wouldn’t touch us” (I21). 
4.5.2 Expenditure
GEM’s operational expenditure totalled £146,00024 in the 
year ending April 2018 (GEM, 2019). Besides depreciation25 of 
£68,000, significant expenditure items included a donation of 
£35,000 to the Waterfall Fund (Section 4.5.3) and rent of £16,000 
paid to FLS to lease26 the Garmony Hydro site (Section 4.3.4). 
Further costs included administration fees (£3,550), insurance 
(£5,650) and professional fees (including accountancy and 
legal fees) (£9,023), as well as £7,000 for cost of sales (e.g. 
maintenance and repair).27 GEM also had to service £76,000 of 
finance interest, including £57,000 of loan interest and £19,000 
of community share interest. 
Once GEM’s contribution to the community’s Waterfall Fund was 
accounted for, GEM recorded a net profit of £20,000, which was 
carried forward for future use. For example, GEM sets aside  
 
24 This includes administrative costs of £139,604, plus cost of sales of £6,669.
25 An accountant’s estimation of the reduction in the value of tangible assets in a year.
26 The rent is set at 6% of GEM’s gross income on the cost per kW of the scheme (I21). This assumes £1.4m cost and the turbine being rated at 400 kW.
27 A specialised contractor undertakes a maintenance check on the facility annually, and the intake grille at the weir is checked weekly to ensure it is clear of debris, 
at a cost of approx. £4,000 per year (Green Energy Mull, 2014).
28 We assume that all donations in GEM’s accounts are to the Waterfall Fund.
29 This figure is derived by adding the total raised in community shares (£485,000), the total from both the CARES Loan (£150,000) and grant (£20,000), the REIF 
loan (£434,000), and the Charity Bank Loan (£500,000) as detailed by Local Energy Scotland (LES, 2015) and our survey (figures from the survey take precedence 
over those in the case study where there are discrepancies, for consistency).
£2,000 per annum for decommissioning (Green Energy Mull, 
2014).
4.5.3 Surplus and Community Benefit Fund
Currently, the hydro donates about £35,000 a year of its surplus 
to a community benefit fund administered by The Waterfall 
Fund. Between April 2015 and the end of March 2018, £85,000 
has been donated to the fund28 (GEM, 2018, 2019).
The Waterfall Fund accepts applications for grants from Mull, Iona 
and the small neighbouring islands (e.g. Ulva, Gometra, Erraid) 
of up to £5,000 (The Waterfall Fund, 2019b). It is offered to 
projects that provide a “clear benefit to the community and will 
deliver transformational change” (The Waterfall Fund, 2019a), 
typically led by small organisations rather than large companies 
or statutory service providers. These span a broad range of 
activities that include, but extend beyond, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency initiatives (The Waterfall Fund, 2019c), such as in:
•  affordable housing
•  youth
•  business and economic development
•  cultural heritage and the arts
•  spiritual, mental and physical wellbeing
• community care
Approximately half of the £85,000 fund has so far been 
committed to community projects (~£43,000) (The Waterfall 
Fund, 2019d). Thus far, the community benefit fund has 
contributed to a whole range of projects, ranging from £200 
for new lighting for Tobermory Parish Church (in Mull’s most 
populated settlement) to £5,000 for a minibus for Tobermory 
High School (see Appendix B for a full list of beneficiaries of the 
Waterfall Fund). The fund has also provided money for the start-
up costs of a book festival, a pump for an aquarium and new 
shelving for a library (ibid). 
Looking forward, the amount donated to the community fund 
by GEM will remain at around £20,000 – £30,000 per annum 
for the next 12–15 years, until it has paid back its debts. GEM 
is expected to achieve this aim in the early 2030s, when 
donations could grow to £150,000 per year, but only until the 
FiT payments are discontinued in 2035. After the FiT payments 
cease, donations are projected to drop back to between 
£20,000 and £30,000 per year (Green Energy Mull, 2014).
4.5.4 Funding and finance 
GEM raised approximately £1.59m to deliver a 400 kW hydro 
facility, including all costs incurred during planning, design, 
installation and commissioning (LES, 2015: S1).29 This was 
raised via a mixture of grants, shares and loans. 
MICT obtained a grant of £20,000 from the Scottish 
Government-funded CARES for a feasibility study. A loan of 
£150,000, charged at 10% per annum, was also attained 
from CARES to cover all costs until financial close (LES, 2015). 
This development loan came with a write-off facility, “should 
the project fail to gain planning consent or meets another 
insurmountable obstacle” (LES, 2018). This helped de-risk the 
early stages of a project for the community group, when risk 
deters commercial banks (I5).30  
To cover the capital cost of the project (as well as interest accrued 
from the CARES loan), GEM used a combination of shares and 
loans: a share issuance of £485,000 modelled on a 4% return per 
annum, a REIF loan of £434,000 at 7% (fixed rate) per annum for 
12 years and a bank loan of £500,000 from the Charity Bank at 
5.25% (variable rate) per annum for 12 years (S1) (Table 3). 
It is also worth noting how the £2.5m ACCESS project 
was funded, with £1.8m coming from the Scottish Government’s 
Local Energy Challenge Fund31 and the rest from Ofgem’s 
Electricity Network Innovation Allowance via SSEN (£0.3m) and 
(£0.4m) from project partners as contributions in kind, such as 
Element Energy, VCharge and the local council (CES, 2018). 
GEM’s 2018 accounts highlighted total debts of £900,000, 
£733,000 of which was due after more than one year. Whilst 
this is a considerable sum, GEM is dispensing with this debt at 
an impressive rate, reducing its total debt by £71,000 on the 
previous year (GEM, 2019).
Share finance
GEM was one of the very first community organisations in 
Scotland to raise share finance to deliver energy projects: 
“I don’t think anybody certainly this side of the country had 
tried it” (I21). However, GEM was driven towards community 
shares, not through choice but necessity, with grant funding 
for construction unavailable and the administration of ordinary 
shares prohibitively expensive (see Table 2 in Section 3). 
Furthermore, since partial self-financing, in this case through 
community finance, was a necessary condition of potential 
lenders (see below), the community energy group had little 
option but to pursue the community shares option. 
30 As one interviewee puts it: “even a high interest loan that could be written off was a much better risk profile than taking out a loan of their own at 5%” (I5).
31 The fund aims to establish “low carbon demonstrator projects which show a local energy economy approach linking energy generation to energy use” (LES, 2019).
Yet, once they had explored the option, it made sense both 
ethically (as outlined in Section 3) and financially. GEM’s 
financial modelling of the project proposed an annual return on 
the community shares of 4% (MICT, 2014), the cheapest form of 
finance available to the group. GEM’s project manager explains: 
“our target was to fund the whole thing [with community shares]”, 
but for a “small island scheme stuck in the back end of nowhere 
… it was always going to be [difficult]” (I21). Notably, however, 
the sufficiently attractive interest rate offered on the shares was 
only possible because of the FiT. As MICT’s director explains, 
the project was instigated at a time when the “level of financial 
incentive from the Feed-in-Tariff still meant that it was viable 
financially to develop these projects” (I22). Ultimately, the share 
offer fell short of delivering the full cost of the project. Nonetheless, 
it exceeded the target of one third of the project costs. 
The share offer was launched in November 2013 and, by 
mid-2014, £485,000 had been raised: £155,000 more than 
the £330,000 target. In retrospect, GEM’s project manager 
considers it to have been a mistake to have launched the share 
offer in November. Whilst in the lead up to Christmas the offer 
went well, in January uptake “stopped dead” (I21). Only after 
the share offer was publicised nationally by the journalist and 
campaigner Lesley Riddoch, who published an article about 
the project in The Scotsman newspaper (see Riddoch, 2014), 
did interest pick up again. Investors are both local people 
and outsiders. GEM’s key agent explains: “two thirds of those 
investors are pretty much from on the island or from people with 
close associations with the island” (I21). 
Being an early pioneer of community shares had its 
disadvantages. The project manager understands that greater 
use and knowledge of community shares have improved the 
availability of this relatively cheap form of finance, since GEM’s 
share offer. Given this increase in awareness, he stated: “I think 
if we said now we were going to do another share offer, we 
might get a whole lot more” (I21). 
Table 3: Funding and financing secured by GEM 
Date Type Source Amount 
(£)
Interest  
rate
Duration Annual 
repayments
Notes 
2010 Grant CARES £20,000 N/A N/A N/A Feasibility study
2013 Soft loan CARES  
Development Loan
£150,000 10% N/A Flexible 
duration, but 
to be repaid 
at financial 
close.
To cover costs prior to raising 
share capital. CARES loan 
would have turned into a grant, 
had the project failed. Covered 
costs such as procuring the 
installation contract, legal 
advice, marketing of share 
offer, project management ,etc.
2014 Community 
shares
Various small 
investors
£485,000 4% N/A Not fixed. In 
2018, it was 
£19,200.
2015 Loan Charity Bank £500,000 5.25% 15 years £56,592 
total debt 
interest paid 
in 2018
Senior lender
2015 Loan REIF £434,000 7% 12 years Junior lender
(Sources: LES, 2015; interviews, GEM accounts) 
FINANCING COMMUNITY ENERGY CASE STUDIES: GREEN ENERGY MULL
12 13
Loan finance
Initially, the group had approached various potential lenders, 
including both banks that specialise in more ethical finance 
and high street banks. However, the experience was often a 
frustrating and disheartening one. The project manager talked 
to ethical bank Triodos, but states: “we were actually too small 
for Triodos, they were looking at two million plus schemes”. 
Lloyds TSB told the group that they only invested in solar and 
wind. 
Eventually, the project manager came across two options 
which enabled the project. The first was Charity Bank, an 
ethical bank which is “owned by charitable and social purpose 
organisations” (Charity Bank, 2019). GEM’s project manager 
describes Charity Bank as “a bank of the old school”, i.e., “very 
risk adverse” that had “never done a hydro scheme in Scotland 
before”. The other was the “semi-private” REIF, now called EIF, 
which is delivered by the Scottish Investment Bank, a fund 
run by Scottish Enterprise, a government agency, on behalf 
of the Scottish Government. The lenders agreed that, if the 
community energy group could raise one third of the sum for 
the construction of the facility themselves, then the two lenders 
would also contribute one third of the sum each. It is typical of 
the role of REIF to contribute partial funding. It is “a gap funder, 
and will only invest where there is a demonstrable funding gap 
32 For example, BHESCo, another one of our cases, issues shares modelled on a 5% return on investments. The most expensive financial instrument issued by Gwent 
Energy, another of our cases, is a bond with a 6% interest over 20 years, although this benefits the company by being longer-term debt in which only interest is 
paid for 20 years. (Cairns et al., 2020a, 2020b).
in a project’s funding package” (Scottish Enterprise, 2019). Its 
role is largely to act as a junior lender to “help de-risk” projects 
for the senior lender (I2). 
Notably, the two lenders offered GEM different terms. The 
Charity Bank offered a relatively low interest rate of 5.25%. 
This is comparable to the interest rates that other community 
energy organisations achieve using community-based financing 
methods, such as shares or bonds.32 The Scottish Government-
backed REIF loan was more expensive, offering a rate of 7%. 
Importantly however, the Charity Bank rate is variable, while 
the REIF rate is fixed. So the Charity Bank’s loan could become 
more expensive, depending on developments in the broader 
economy. The Charity Bank initially offered a fixed rate, but this 
was withdrawn late in the negotiations, meaning they settled on 
a variable rate loan. 
The experience of working with the two lenders also differed. 
Whilst REIF offered a higher interest rate than the Charity 
Bank, the agreement with REIF was straightforward to arrange 
(I21). In contrast, the Charity Bank loan took some time to be 
ratified, mainly due to complications around the different legal 
jurisdictions of the project, with GEM based in Scotland and the 
Charity Bank registered in England.
5 Future developments
Looking forward, MICT is reticent about pursuing another 
energy project, because financial returns are less attractive, 
largely because of the withdrawal of the FiT. If MICT were to 
instigate a new project now, it would deliver less surplus to be 
redistributed as community investment. GEM’s project manager 
explains that, since Garmony Hydro was built, “construction 
costs have gone up and [the] Feed in Tariff [has] gone down” 
(I21). Consequently, without the FiT, the project’s pay-back 
period is much longer and so the time when the community 
is “actually going to really start benefitting from it has gone 
probably from 12 years to over 30” (I21). 
It is felt that the significantly longer pay-back period presented 
“a much more difficult story to sell” to investors and to the 
community (I21), with the former typically wanting a return 
on their investment, and the latter wanting to see tangible 
community benefits within a few years. However, GEM’s project 
manager concedes that such a timeframe is still technically 
“doable” for a hydro scheme, which, after all, can last for 100 
years. So the group will “monitor what’s going on, on the island, 
to see if we could do another one” (I21). This might include 
partnering with a local private landowner. 
The GEM project manager believes that the future of such 
projects will depend on what happens post-FiT. He says that, in 
the absence of FiTs, some other form of public support may be 
required, because “financially viable schemes need significant 
funding” (I21). Assuming the FiT is unlikely to recommence, he 
suggests that a return to grants or the introduction of state-
backed interest-free loans would be a good route forward. This 
is because neither of these options imposes the burden of debt 
interest, making the overall cost of projects less expensive, in 
turn allowing a better return on investment and greater benefit 
to the community. Now that the ACCESS project has shown that 
actions can be taken to overcome some grid restraints, the funding 
issue for GEM is “the biggest restriction that we’ve got” (I21).
Instead of prioritising the development of a new asset, GEM 
is considering capturing more value from the asset which they 
already have: Garmony Hydro. In the short to medium term, they 
will pay off the debts owed to the two lenders, which will free 
up revenue to make more social investments on the island via 
the Waterfall Fund. In the longer term, they will also start buying 
shares back, again, to “maximise the amount of money we can 
put into community projects” (I21).
Perhaps more ambitiously, the group is exploring the creation 
of a local energy tariff. Indeed, this concept was an element 
of ACCESS (CES, 2015: 8), which appealed to the community 
energy group (I22). During the ACCESS project, one objective 
was to prove the technological basis on which the future 
deployment of a specific form of local tariff could be deployed 
(I33). This particular local tariff concept was to be based on the 
non-firm/‘local load dependent’ system activated during the 
project. In theory, it would allow a lower-cost tariff for electricity 
demand that matched constrained generation. Value would be 
shared between the generator (from the increased generation) 
and the electricity consumers, who would benefit from cheaper 
electricity by sourcing it at certain times. This is comparable to 
the concept of off-peak tariffs, where customers benefit from 
a cheaper tariff for using electricity at a time when there is 
little demand. But, instead, the ACCESS project would lay the 
foundations for a tariff that would be dynamically dependent on 
both the output of the hydro scheme and the level of constraint 
in the network. 
A local generator would partner with a socially minded 
supplier, which would offer customers in the grid-constrained 
area a lower local tariff. The supplier would offer a local tariff 
for Demand Side Response-enabled load and contract with 
an aggregator to manage this demand (LES, 2018). In effect, 
“customers allow their load to be controlled in return for 
cheaper energy … which creates a portfolio of flexible load” 
(LES, 2018: 59). The aggregator is therefore able to match 
this demand to local supply, meaning the supplier is able 
to “procure generation cheaply from de-constrained local 
renewables … that would otherwise be curtailed at below 
market prices” (ibid).
The commercial arrangements were intended to be a 
subsequent phase, following the successful demonstration of 
the necessary technical arrangements, implemented at a future 
date subject to market developments and further funding (I33). 
This second phase has not yet been forthcoming. As the GEM 
project manager has put it, the local tariff idea “was looking 
very promising, but it fell by the wayside unfortunately” (I22). 
However, MICT and GEM have still sought to advance the idea 
of a local tariff in discussions with potential partners, including 
OVO Energy, which purchased VCharge during the ACCESS 
project. From the perspective of GEM’s leadership, a local tariff 
could see islanders pay less for their power per unit, compared 
with the standard market rate. GEM would also receive more 
for its power per unit than its current arrangements with Good 
Energy. GEM is especially interested in developing a tariff that 
might be means tested, to offer particular savings to those in 
fuel poverty (I22). The chief issue with this approach is whether 
a supplier utilising such a tariff could still maintain revenue 
sufficient to maintain its operations, something which GEM’s 
chair recognises: 
“[T]he question is whether a socially motivated 
electricity supply company could cover its costs 
and operate in that way to purchase electricity 
from the community generator and sell it to 
somebody in fuel poverty and still comply with 
all the legislative requirements of Ofgem” (I22). 
GEM’s leadership is therefore sceptical about the possibilities 
for developing a suitable partnership with a supplier in the near 
future, although its chair suggests that “it still might happen” 
(I22). If it does, then the legacy of ACCESS will more fully reflect 
its initial promise and provide Mull with greater lasting benefit. 
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6 Key lessons
33 Notably, the 10% interest from the CARES loan is even more expensive. However, the CARES loan is for the earlier and risker development stage of the project (I5).
1. Government subsidy is the cornerstone to securing 
community and external finance
The FiT accounts for roughly 80% of GEM’s annual revenue.  
It provides a 20-year guarantee of a revenue stream that is 
at least double the per unit revenue it receives via its PPA. 
GEM’s story points to a financing chain in which securing the 
FiT meant that it was able to raise significant share capital via 
a competitive interest rate. This in turn enabled GEM to raise 
further finance from institutional investors and government-
backed finance schemes. 
Removing the FiT increases the project risk for investors, 
blocking access to share or debt finance. In effect, the 
subsidy acted as the cornerstone to securing finance for 
Mull’s community energy project. Furthermore, the FiT is an 
operational subsidy, and, in order to access it, community 
energy organisations must secure capital financing because 
they lack upfront capital. Discontinuing the FiT removes both a 
key motive and an opportunity to secure project finance.
2. The limits of community finance in low population 
or less affluent areas
Despite overwhelming support from the community for 
the project, and successfully raising £485,000 in shares, 
community finance still covered only about 30% of the 
total investment needed. GEM’s inability to raise enough 
finance locally meant it relied on loans from a combination of 
government-backed schemes and ethical institutional investors. 
The story of GEM reflects the challenges of raising finance 
from a rural location with low population density and a below-
average disposable household income.
3. Loan finance expensive and/or difficult to secure 
from both public and private sector
An inability to raise sufficient funds via community shares 
necessitated the sourcing of more expensive loan finance, i.e. 
above a 4% interest rate. Sourcing loan finance for a small-to-
medium-sized generation project also proved a challenge. The 
Garmony Hydro project found itself 'caught in the middle': it 
was too large to be entirely financed by community finance, but 
too small to be of interest to high street banks or a major social 
lender such as Triodos. GEM had little option but to turn to 
alternative, socially motivated, lenders. Funds were a challenge 
to secure, partly because share financing of community energy 
was a rarity at the time, and the Charity Bank became involved 
in the bank’s first energy project in Scotland. 
Importantly, the Charity Bank offered a lower interest rate to 
GEM than the Scottish-Government backed REIF: 5.25% versus 
7%.33 This raises questions about such state-backed finance 
schemes, if the marketplace is offering commercial loans at a 
lower cost; whilst state aid regulations dictate that government 
loans cannot dramatically undercut commercial ones, they 
could at least be revised to better reflect what the marketplace 
is offering.
4. Communities present important test beds for 
innovation, but direct long-term benefits may not 
be forthcoming
As part of the ACCESS project, GEM demonstrated the 
important role community energy groups can play as trusted 
intermediaries to recruit local residents for technology 
demonstration projects, helping create a space for 
experimentation. The project demonstrated: a) the practical 
application of smart grid balancing services; and b) the viability 
of local network safeguards to manage peaks in supply and/or 
troughs in demand on constrained network areas. The latter has 
benefitted the DNO, which has been able to use the insights to 
offer new flexible connections to new generators in constrained 
areas, without major upgrades to the network infrastructure. 
The project has demonstrated the potential to export more 
electricity to the grid safely through non-firm grid connections, 
making connection easier for decentralised generators on Mull 
and elsewhere. However, there are questions about the extent 
to which the Mull community has directly benefitted from 
the project. For example, the technology that facilitated the 
balancing of local supply (i.e. hydro) and demand (i.e. electrical 
heat) was removed, even though the new electrical heating 
systems were left in place, which eliminated another possible 
route to market for Garmony Hydro. 
The project also sought to lay the foundations for a local flexible 
energy tariff but this has not yet been forthcoming. GEM’s story 
is, therefore, one that highlights how communities offer an 
important space for experimentation but how safeguards are 
needed to ensure that they enjoy long-term benefits from acting 
as test beds for new technology.
5. Partnerships with public land owners critical to 
project delivery
The Garmony Hydro project relied on a major public landowner 
– Forestry and Land Scotland – making land available for lease. 
This partnership was built on both parties sharing certain 
social and environmental objectives, with FLS making the land 
available for a not exorbitant fee. Landowning organisations 
with a strong emphasis on public and environmental value are 
critical to making available the necessary land to deliver larger-
scale community energy projects, assuming that the community 
does not have control over suitable land itself.
6. Legal structures are shaped by finance and risk
The decision to establish a BenCom was based predominantly 
on the decision to establish GEM as a ‘special purpose vehicle' 
to raise shares, something which the parent organisation  
MICT, as a CLG, could not do. The factors shaping this decision 
included MICT’s leadership wishing the hydro project was at 
'arms length', to insulate the development trust from financial 
risk, and that the BenCom model offered the potential for 
raising significant finance through community shares.
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Appendix A – List of interviewees
Ref Role Organisation type Date
S1 (Survey) N/A N/A TBC
I2 (Interview) Manager Government Aug 2018
I5 Energy Systems Manger Community energy intermediary Aug 2018
I21 Project Officer Community energy organisation Oct 2018
I22 Director Development Trust Oct 2018
I23 Research and Development Engineer DNO Nov 2018
I24 Energy Strategy Manager DNO Nov 2018
I33 ACCESS Project Manager Community energy intermediary August 2019
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Appendix B – List of beneficiaries of the Waterfall Fund to May 2018
Recipient Amount Purpose Date of Award
Dervaig Community Hall £2,000 Hall refurbishments May 2018
Iona Football Club £1,000 New football goals May 2018
Headland Explorations £500 Climbing equipment May 2018
Tobermory Book Festival £500 Start-up costs May 2018
Seahawks Cheerleading Academy £500 Start-up costs May 2018
Tobermory Fire Cadets £1,500 New uniforms May 2018
Mull & Iona U3A £500 Advertising, printing, accommodation and training May 2018
Air Ghleus £1,500 Mod tuition Jan 2018
Ross of Mull Historical Centre £1,200 New website construction Jan 2018
Mull First Aid £1,400 Pain relief equipment Jan 2018
Mull Mod £500 Creating a Mull song book Jan 2018
Iona Primary School Parent Council £1,910 Summer camp for Iona primary pupils Jan 2018
Mull Highland Games £1,500 New shed Jan 2018
Comar £500 Visual arts programme Jan 2018
Mull Aquarium £2,000 New pump Jan 2018
Mull and Iona Community Enterprise (MICE) £3,500 Swimming lessons for primary schools Oct 2017
Tobermory High School Parent Council £5,000 Minibus for Tobermory High School Oct 2017
Isle of Mull Bird Club £500 Match funding for new high-quality projector Oct 2017
South West Mull and Iona Development £1250 Equipment for office at the Columba Centre Oct 2017
Tobermory Snooker Club £485 Windows and doors renewal Jun 2017
Craignure Golf Club £2,000 Water to club house Jun 2017
Western Isles Yacht Club £1,000 New storage container Jun 2017
Mull Runners £1,100 Electronic chip timing system Jun 2017
Dervaig Community Library £982 Shelving for new library Jun 2017
Mull Community Council £500 Restoration of Dugald MacPhail monument Jun 2017
Tobermory Golf Club £1,415 Fencing and signage for golf course path Jun 2017
Tobermory Primary Gaelic Choir £1,000 New kilts Jan 2017
Tobermory Parish Church £200 New outside lighting Jan 2017
NHS and A&BC Youth Services £1,420 Health and Wellbeing Club at Tobermory Primary School Jan 2017
Aros Hall £2,000 Replacement windows Jan 2017
Isle of Mull Gaelic Choir £800 Production of a CD Oct 2016
Mull Safe and Sound £2,000 Initial set up costs of running group Oct 2016
Lochbuie Mobile £325 Mobile signal booster Oct 2016
Dervaig Community Orchard £1,000 Fencing for orchard Oct 2016
Ulva School Community Association £1,956 Equipment for first responder bag Oct 2016
Craignure Playpark £5,000 New equipment Oct 2016
Hebridean Whale and Dolphin Trust £500 Improvements to shop front Oct 2016
(Source: Waterfall Fund, 2019d)
Appendix C – Key features of common legal structures
Legal structure Governance Limited  
liability
Fundraising Asset  
lock
Charitable 
status
Notes
Community 
Benefit Society 
(BenCom)
One shareholder, one vote. 
Run for benefit of (defined) 
community.
Yes Grants, community 
shares, loans, bonds.
Yes Possible Prioritises community 
benefit; typically lower 
returns on investment 
than co-ops.
Bona fide 
cooperative
One shareholder, one vote. 
Run for the benefit of 
members. 
Yes Community shares, 
loans, bonds. 
Excluded from some 
grants and loans,  
e.g. CARES grants  
and loans. 
No Difficult More flexibility with 
returns to investors. 
Financial Conduct 
Authority places 
conditions upon grid 
export.
Community 
Interest 
Company (CIC)
Voting rights depend on 
whether CLG or CLS status.  
Run for defined social 
purpose.
Yes Grants, ordinary  
shares (capped 
returns), loans,  
bonds.
Yes No Expensive to raise equity 
investment. 
Light touch regulation. 
Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
(CLG)
Membership organisation 
with flexible structure.  
Often nominal (£1) 
membership fee.  
One member one vote 
common.
Yes Grants, ordinary  
shares (capped 
returns), loans,  
bonds.
Possible Possible Different categories of 
members with different 
voting rights possible.  
No equity investment 
possible. 
Charitable 
Incorporated 
Organisation/
Scottish CIO
Membership appoints 
board of trustees.
Yes Grants, loans, bonds. Yes Yes Strictly regulated.  
No equity investment 
possible. 
Charitable Trust 
(unincorporated)
Board of trustees. No Grants, loans, bonds. Yes Yes Strictly regulated. 
No equity investment 
possible. 
Private Company 
Limited by 
Shares (CLS)
One share, one vote. Yes Grants, loans,  
(privately exchanged) 
ordinary shares, bonds.
No No Shares cannot be made 
available to the public.
Public Limited 
Company (PLC) 
One share, one vote. Yes Grants, loans, publicly 
offered ordinary  
shares, bonds.
No No Structure familiar to 
institutional investors.  
Strictly regulated. 
Expensive to raise equity 
finance. 
(Source: Community Shares Unit, 2019; Databuild, 2014; Smith and Teasdale, 2012; Thorlby, 2011; I2; I4; Braunholtz-Speight et al., 2018.)

